To all those who are impatient for this certificate to be approved and implemented for Gecko-based products:
The presence of a root certificate in the NSS database used by Gecko-based products indicates that users can place some degree of trust in the use of that certificate for secure Web browsing. For that trust to be valid, the certificate authority owning the root certificate must undergo some scrutiny, which takes time.
The timeline for such scrutiny is described at <https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Schedule>, which also shows the current queue for the public discussion that is part of the process. As noted in comment #2, some required information is missing. That information must be provided by the certificate authority before this request can enter the queue.
Thus, the problem lies in the hands of ipsCA and not Mozilla. As pointed out in comment #18, the very late recognition by ipsCA that they had to replace a root certificate that was about to expire compounded the problem.
Further expressions of the need for haste will not speed the process. Any shortcuts or other measures to hasten the process can only weaken the trust users have in the overall certificate database.
To all those who are impatient for this certificate to be approved and implemented for Gecko-based products:
The presence of a root certificate in the NSS database used by Gecko-based products indicates that users can place some degree of trust in the use of that certificate for secure Web browsing. For that trust to be valid, the certificate authority owning the root certificate must undergo some scrutiny, which takes time.
The timeline for such scrutiny is described at <https:/ /wiki.mozilla. org/CA: Schedule>, which also shows the current queue for the public discussion that is part of the process. As noted in comment #2, some required information is missing. That information must be provided by the certificate authority before this request can enter the queue.
Thus, the problem lies in the hands of ipsCA and not Mozilla. As pointed out in comment #18, the very late recognition by ipsCA that they had to replace a root certificate that was about to expire compounded the problem.
Further expressions of the need for haste will not speed the process. Any shortcuts or other measures to hasten the process can only weaken the trust users have in the overall certificate database.