US CERT writes: <http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/836068>
> Do not use the MD5 algorithm
> Software developers, Certification Authorities, website owners,
> and users should avoid using the MD5 algorithm in any capacity.
> As previous research has demonstrated, it should be considered
> cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use.
I propose to
* Announce now that we will drop MD5 in 1 or 3 months
* Apply the patch in a future security release
I think that waiting one more 1-2 years more is too long. If somebody finds a way that does not require two random parts (signed cert determined by attacker and attackers matching faked cert), but only one (take one of the already signed ones and create a matching fake cert), it's entirely over.
US CERT writes: <http:// www.kb. cert.org/ vuls/id/ 836068>
> Do not use the MD5 algorithm
> Software developers, Certification Authorities, website owners,
> and users should avoid using the MD5 algorithm in any capacity.
> As previous research has demonstrated, it should be considered
> cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use.
I propose to
* Announce now that we will drop MD5 in 1 or 3 months
* Apply the patch in a future security release
I think that waiting one more 1-2 years more is too long. If somebody finds a way that does not require two random parts (signed cert determined by attacker and attackers matching faked cert), but only one (take one of the already signed ones and create a matching fake cert), it's entirely over.