* debian/patches/aa-kernel-compat-check.patch: Drop this patch. It was a
temporary compatibility check to paper over incompatibilities between
dbus-daemon, libapparmor, and the AppArmor kernel code while AppArmor
D-Bus mediation was in development.
* debian/patches/aa-mediation.patch: Fix a bug that resulted in all actions
denied by AppArmor to be audited. Auditing such actions is the default,
but it should be possible to quiet audit messages by using the "deny"
AppArmor rule modifier. (LP: #1226356)
* debian/patches/aa-mediation.patch: Fix a bug in the code that builds
AppArmor queries for the process that is receiving a message. The
message's destination was being used, as opposed to the message's source,
as the peer name in the query string. (LP: #1233895)
* debian/patches/aa-mediate-eavesdropping.patch: Don't allow applications
that are confined by AppArmor to eavesdrop. Ideally, this would be
configurable with AppArmor policy, but the parser does not yet support
any type of eavesdropping permission. For now, confined applications will
simply not be allowed to eavesdrop. (LP: #1229280)
-- Tyler Hicks <email address hidden> Fri, 04 Oct 2013 09:59:21 -0700
This bug was fixed in the package dbus - 1.6.12-0ubuntu8
---------------
dbus (1.6.12-0ubuntu8) saucy; urgency=low
* debian/ patches/ aa-kernel- compat- check.patch: Drop this patch. It was a patches/ aa-mediation. patch: Fix a bug that resulted in all actions patches/ aa-mediation. patch: Fix a bug in the code that builds patches/ aa-mediate- eavesdropping. patch: Don't allow applications
temporary compatibility check to paper over incompatibilities between
dbus-daemon, libapparmor, and the AppArmor kernel code while AppArmor
D-Bus mediation was in development.
* debian/
denied by AppArmor to be audited. Auditing such actions is the default,
but it should be possible to quiet audit messages by using the "deny"
AppArmor rule modifier. (LP: #1226356)
* debian/
AppArmor queries for the process that is receiving a message. The
message's destination was being used, as opposed to the message's source,
as the peer name in the query string. (LP: #1233895)
* debian/
that are confined by AppArmor to eavesdrop. Ideally, this would be
configurable with AppArmor policy, but the parser does not yet support
any type of eavesdropping permission. For now, confined applications will
simply not be allowed to eavesdrop. (LP: #1229280)
-- Tyler Hicks <email address hidden> Fri, 04 Oct 2013 09:59:21 -0700