An additional sandbox is probably rather a security win than a security risk. It would be great if that could be MIRed before feature freeze.
GDK-pixbuf, Evince and other "thumbnailer users" seem to depend on that: http://www.hadess.net/2017/07/security-for-security-gods-sandboxing.html
To quote Bastien Nocera: " For GNOME 3.26 (and today in git master), the thumbnailer stall will be doubly bolted by a Bubblewrap sandbox and a seccomp blacklist.
This closes a whole vector of attack for the GNOME Desktop,..."
An additional sandbox is probably rather a security win than a security risk. It would be great if that could be MIRed before feature freeze.
GDK-pixbuf, Evince and other "thumbnailer users" seem to depend on that: http:// www.hadess. net/2017/ 07/security- for-security- gods-sandboxing .html
To quote Bastien Nocera: " For GNOME 3.26 (and today in git master), the thumbnailer stall will be doubly bolted by a Bubblewrap sandbox and a seccomp blacklist.
This closes a whole vector of attack for the GNOME Desktop,..."