This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added as to the bug as attachments.
Reported via private E-mail from Michael Scherer
- There is several instance of using a fixed name without verification for updating/resetting the configuration :
This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added as to the bug as attachments.
Reported via private E-mail from Michael Scherer
- There is several instance of using a fixed name without verification for updating/resetting the configuration :
Mongodb:
https:/ /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ mongodb/ service. py#L176 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ mongodb/ system. py#L26
https:/
Postgresql: /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ postgresql/ service/ config. py#L70
https:/
Redis: /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ redis/service. py#L30 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ redis/service. py#L236
https:/
https:/
Mysql: /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ mysql/service. py#L50 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ mysql/service. py#L790
https:/
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Not that there is others occurrence of this pattern in the mysql part.
All of them are therefor vulnerable to someone injecting configuration, which could result in a privilege escalation.
- Cassandra use a /tmp file to run a command, without checking anything. /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ cassandra/ system. py#L33 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/datastore/ experimental/ cassandra/ service. py#L230
So this is vulnerable to a race condition and command injection by any local user to access the cassandra store.
https:/
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- Couchbase also dump to a file in /tmp/ with a predictable name ( so usual overwrite attack, etc, etc ) /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/strategies/ backup/ experimental/ couchbase_ impl.py# L30
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- Mysql dump/restore modules also use a file in /tmp/ with a predictable and not verified name for logs : /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/strategies/ restore/ mysql_impl. py#L194 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/strategies/ backup/ mysql_impl. py#L55 /github. com/openstack/ trove/blob/ master/ trove/guestagen t/strategies/ backup/ mysql_impl. py#L110
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