The IptablesFirewallDriver does not prevent spoofing other instances or a routers MAC and/or IP addresses. The rule to permit DHCP discovery and request messages:
If L2population is not used, an instance can spoof the Neutron router's MAC address and cause the switches to learn a MAC move, allowing the instance to intercept other instances traffic potentially belonging to other tenants if this is shared network.
The solution for this is to permit this DHCP traffic only from the instance's IP address and the unspecified IPv4 address 0.0.0.0/32 rather than from an IPv4 source, additionally the source MAC address should be restricted to MAC addresses assigned to the instance's Neutron port.
The IptablesFirewal lDriver does not prevent spoofing other instances or a routers MAC and/or IP addresses. The rule to permit DHCP discovery and request messages:
ipv4_rules += [comment_rule('-p udp -m udp --sport 68 --dport 67 '
'-j RETURN', comment= ic.DHCP_ CLIENT) ]
is too permissive, it does not enforce the source MAC or IP address. This is the IPv4 case of public bug https:/ /bugs.launchpad .net/neutron/ +bug/1502933, and a solution was previously mentioned in June 2013 in https:/ /bugs.launchpad .net/neutron/ +bug/1427054.
If L2population is not used, an instance can spoof the Neutron router's MAC address and cause the switches to learn a MAC move, allowing the instance to intercept other instances traffic potentially belonging to other tenants if this is shared network.
The solution for this is to permit this DHCP traffic only from the instance's IP address and the unspecified IPv4 address 0.0.0.0/32 rather than from an IPv4 source, additionally the source MAC address should be restricted to MAC addresses assigned to the instance's Neutron port.