for PKI tokens, we are bypassing token.get_token() call and therefore skipping the “valid=True” check.
In Grizzly, this code is in keystone/token/controllers.py
In Folsom, this code is in keystone/service.py
The if block bypasses the backend check. It is in the backend where tokens are checked for revocation.
def _get_token_ref(self, context, token_id, belongs_to=None):
"""Returns a token if a valid one exists.
Optionally, limited to a token owned by a specific tenant.
"""
# TODO(termie): this stuff should probably be moved to middleware self.assert_admin(context)
if cms.is_ans1_token(token_id):
data = json.loads(cms.cms_verify(cms.token_to_cms(token_id), CONF.signing.certfile, CONF.signing.ca_certs)) data['access']['token']['user'] = data['access']['user'] data['access']['token']['metadata'] = data['access']['metadata']
if belongs_to: assert data['access']['token']['tenant']['id'] == belongs_to token_ref = data['access']['token']
else: token_ref = self.token_api.get_token(context=context, token_id=token_id)
return token_ref
The exposure is limited to people that are passing the whole PKI token back for validation via the web service.
This PKI tokens were supposed to be validated primarily via Crypto, but there is an option to validate them against the live server as well. It is only this last code path that is affected. It is unlikely to be triggered in Folsom, as people have to make a deliberate decision to use PKI tokens, and are unlikely to be validating them against the Keystone server.
Remote services can choose to pass a Hash of the PKI token to the validate Web API, which web services are likely to do, as the Hash is short enough to fit in a cookie. The Hash is then it looked up using the backend get_token() behavior and works correctly.
It does not effect the keystone calls that first require validating the token. For example if a user runs tenant_list against their own account, using a PKI token, they do
for PKI tokens, we are bypassing token.get_token() call and therefore skipping the “valid=True” check.
In Grizzly, this code is in keystone/ token/controlle rs.py
In Folsom, this code is in keystone/service.py
The if block bypasses the backend check. It is in the backend where tokens are checked for revocation.
def _get_token_ ref(self, context, token_id, belongs_to=None):
"""Returns a token if a valid one exists.
Optionally, limited to a token owned by a specific tenant.
"""
self.assert_ admin(context)
# TODO(termie): this stuff should probably be moved to middleware
if cms.is_ ans1_token( token_id) : cms.cms_ verify( cms.token_ to_cms( token_id) ,
CONF. signing. certfile,
CONF. signing. ca_certs) )
data[ 'access' ]['token' ]['user' ] = data['access' ]['user' ]
data[ 'access' ]['token' ]['metadata' ] = data['access' ]['metadata' ]
assert data['access' ]['token' ]['tenant' ]['id'] == belongs_to
token_ ref = data['access' ]['token' ]
token_ ref = self.token_ api.get_ token(context= context,
token_id= token_id)
data = json.loads(
if belongs_to:
else:
return token_ref
The exposure is limited to people that are passing the whole PKI token back for validation via the web service.
This PKI tokens were supposed to be validated primarily via Crypto, but there is an option to validate them against the live server as well. It is only this last code path that is affected. It is unlikely to be triggered in Folsom, as people have to make a deliberate decision to use PKI tokens, and are unlikely to be validating them against the Keystone server.
Remote services can choose to pass a Hash of the PKI token to the validate Web API, which web services are likely to do, as the Hash is short enough to fit in a cookie. The Hash is then it looked up using the backend get_token() behavior and works correctly.
It does not effect the keystone calls that first require validating the token. For example if a user runs tenant_list against their own account, using a PKI token, they do
token_ref = self.token_ api.get_ token(context= context,
token_id= context[ 'token_ id'])
This was discovered by Guang Yee.