Local root exploit in kernel 2.6.17 - 2.6.24 (vmsplice)

Latest working kernel version:
Earliest failing kernel version: 2.6.17
Distribution: Gentoo
Hardware Environment:
Software Environment:
Problem Description:
Two root exploits have been reported:
http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5093
http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5092

Both exploits cause kernel Oops or (randomly) give root privilegies to the user.

Here is the same bug reported in gentoo bugzilla:
http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209460

Steps to reproduce:
Compile and run the exploit.

Assuming this is about CVE-2008-0009/10, this is fixed with "[PATCH] splice: missing user pointer access verification" which is included in 2.6.24.1 and 2.6.23.15. If someone can confirm my assumption, please close this bug.

It's not properly fixed in 2.6.24.1. E.g. see http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209460

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9924

> It's not properly fixed in 2.6.24.1. E.g. see
> http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209460

Indeed, I can confirm this.

2.6.24.1 fixes this exploit:
http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5093
(labelled "Diane Lane ...")

but does not fix this one, which still gives me root access on 2.6.24.1:
http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5092
("jessica_biel_naked_in_my_bed.c")

alternative link to the still-working exploit:
http://bugs.gentoo.org/attachment.cgi?id=143059&action=view

Daniel

This is NOT fixed in 2.6.24.1: http://www.securityfocus.com/data/vulnerabilities/exploits/27704.c
But this probably is: http://www.securityfocus.com/data/vulnerabilities/exploits/27704-2.c (at least I can't reproduce it).

Linux Rimmer 2.6.24.1 #4 SMP PREEMPT Sat Feb 9 16:50:17 CET 2008 i686 GNU/Linux

I have personally tested both exploits under a recent 2.6.22 release,
latest 2.6.23 and latest 2.6.24. Results:

http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5093 ("diane_lane")
This was a bug added in 2.6.23, still present in 2.6.24, but fixed by
the most recent -stable releases for both branches:
- Not exploitable in 2.6.22.10
- Not exploitable in 2.6.23.15
- Not exploitable in 2.6.24.1
so this one is done and dusted...

http://milw0rm.com/exploits/5092 ("jessica_biel")
alt link: http://bugs.gentoo.org/attachment.cgi?id=143059&action=view
This is still exploitable in the latest kernel releases and the exploit
source suggests it has been present since 2.6.17
- Exploitable in 2.6.22.10
- Exploitable in 2.6.23.15
- Exploitable in 2.6.24.1

Reply-To: <email address hidden>

On Sun, Feb 10, 2008 at 11:28:51AM +0000, Daniel Drake wrote:
> I have personally tested both exploits under a recent 2.6.22 release,
> latest 2.6.23 and latest 2.6.24. Results:

There's a fix/explanation proposed for the other one on linux-kernel

Description of problem:

Local user can obtain root access (as described below).

This bug is being actively exploited in the wild -- our server was just broken
in to by an attacker using it. (They got a user's password by previously
compromising a machine somewhere else where that user had an account, and
installed a modified ssh binary on it to record user names and passwords. Then
they logged in to our site as that user, exploited CVE-2008-0010, and became root).

It is EXTREMELY urgent that a fixed kernel be provided ASAP given that this bug
is being actively exploited in the wild.

There is a fix listed upstream in 2.6.23.15 and 2.6.24.1. However, even after
applying that patch and recompiling the kernel, the escalation-of-privilege
exploit still worked so I am wondering if 2.6.23.15 does not completely fix it.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):

All 2.6.23.x kernels

How reproducible: 100%

Steps to Reproduce:
1. Download http://downloads.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities/exploits/27704.c
2. cc -o exploit 27704.c
3. [as non-privileged user] ./exploit

Actual results:

Root shell

Expected results:

No root shell.

Additional info:

When I altered the kernel spec file for 2.6.23.14-115.fc8 to pull 2.6.23.15
instead of 2.6.23.14 (and altered linux-2.6-highres-timers.patch to apply
cleanly, and removed the already-included-in-2.6.23.15 patches
linux-2.6-net-silence-noisy-printks.patch and
linux-2.6-freezer-fix-apm-emulation-breakage.patch), rebuilt a new kernel RPM,
installed it, and rebooted, the above exploit still worked. So it is possible an
additional patch is needed against 2.6.23, unless I just goofed somehow in my
kernel rebuild. (I did check and the file fs/splice.c was correctly patched and
included the lines that were suppose to fix this problem...)

I see 2.6.23.15 has been built in Koji. When is this going to get pushed into
stable updates?

*** Bug 432244 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

A new system call named vmsplice() was introduced in the 2.6.17
release of the Linux kernel.

COSEINC reported two issues affecting vmsplice, CVE-2008-0009 and CVE-2008-0010.

On Saturday 20080210 a public exploit was released that utilised a similar flaw
in vmsplice (vmsplice_to_pipe function) to allow a local user to gain privileges
on some architectures.

See also
http://marc.info/?t=120263655300003&r=1&w=2

This issue will affect kernels 2.6.17+ and therefore affected Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5, but not Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4, 3, or 2.1.

Relevant information about patch: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/10/118

Relevant discussion at gmane.linux.kernel mailing list:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/637339

Bringing in RH Security Response team.

fixed in Linus' tree as 712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44

Note that there may be a little confusion as there are actually three vmsplice
issues:

CVE-2008-0009 is already fixed upstream, does not affect any RHEL, has no
public exploit. Upstream patch is the second hunk of:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361

CVE-2008-0010 is already fixed upstream, does not affect any RHEL, but has
a public exploit. ( http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/5093 )
Upstream patch is the first hunk of:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361

CVE-2008-0600 is not yet fixed upstream, affects RHEL5,
and has a public exploit ( http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/5092 )

Proposed patch for RHEL5 from Al Viro

diff -urN linux-2.6.18.x86_64/fs/splice.c linux-2.6.18.x86_64-fix/fs/splice.c
--- linux-2.6.18.x86_64/fs/splice.c 2008-02-10 11:08:19.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.18.x86_64-fix/fs/splice.c 2008-02-10 11:31:06.000000000 -0500
@@ -1154,6 +1154,9 @@
                if (unlikely(!base))
                        break;

+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, len)))
+ break;
+
                /*
                 * Get this base offset and number of pages, then map
                 * in the user pages.

I can confirm that applying the patch at the bottom of
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/10/118 (thanks, Pavel!), as well as applying the
patch in 2.6.23.15/2.6.24.1, does indeed prevent the published exploit from
working on our system.

Whether or not it closes all attack vectors, it is probably worth pushing out at
least as an interim update since it prevents the published exploit from working
and that published exploit is being actively exploited in the wild.

Note that I believe a new CVE identifier has been assigned for the vulnerability
that 2.6.23.15/2.6.24.1 does not fix: CVE-2008-0600

Also note that, unlike CVE-2008-0009/0010, this is not specific to the
2.6.23/2.6.24 kernels. Older kernels are vulnerable too (including, for example,
2.6.18-53.1.4.el5 -- on that kernel, it is necessary to add
#define PAGE_SIZE getpagesize() to the published exploit, but with that addition
it works to get an instant root shell.)

I am *extremely* thankful this is only a local escalation-of-privilege and not a
remote root. It's bad enough as it is given what seems to be a significant
number of machines out there with hacked-up ssh/sshd binaries that record user
names and passwords, but a remote root being exploited in the wild like this
well before a working patch would be a nightmare!

Fixing CVE name, the exploit "jessica_biel" is for CVE-2008-0600

*** Bug 432263 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

Confirmed the patch blocks this issue for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5; this
specific exploit prints "[-] vmsplice: Bad address" and fails.

So to fix this you need 2.6.24.1 +
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44

or if backporting, an earlier kernel plus both
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=8811930dc74a503415b35c4a79d14fb0b408a361
and
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44

Upstream fix:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=712a30e63c8066ed84385b12edbfb804f49cbc44

For Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5:
CVSS v2 Base score: 7.2 (High) (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)

We added a quick and dirty patch for the problem here:
http://home.powertech.no/oystein/ptpatch2008/

It is a kernel module that disables vmsplice, and logs any attempts to exploit
the bug.
As it it a loadable module it can easily be deployed on systems that can not be
updated with a new kernel for various reasons.

Ola,

I tried that module on a test system and got:
  <name> kernel: general protection fault: 0000 [1] SMP

Fixed in:

kernel-2.6.24.1-28.fc9
kernel-2.6.23.15-137.fc8
kernel-2.6.23.15-80.fc7

The make file required some modification for PAE kernels due to path issues;
once compiled module fails to load with:
insmod: error inserting 'ptpatch2008.ko': -1 Invalid module format

(double checked to confirm the system.map and modules paths are in fact valid to
the current running kernel version on the system)

kernel-2.6.23.15-137.fc8 has been submitted as an update for Fedora 8

Here's a possible systemtap-based band-aid, until the patched kernels are installed:

stap -g -e 'probe syscall.vmsplice {
   printf("blocking vmsplice (%s) uid %d pid %d exec %s\n", argstr, uid(),
pid(), execname())
   $nr_segs = 0
}'

@Ryan, make sure you have kernel-PAE-devel installed, and then undo your
Makefile path changes. The modules compile and insmod properly for me. Thanks,
Ola!

Created attachment 294535
x86_64 panic on ptpach module load

to clarify, the module from comment#10 panic's on x86_64 for me.

(In reply to comment #13)
> @Ryan, make sure you have kernel-PAE-devel installed, and then undo your
> Makefile path changes. The modules compile and insmod properly for me. Thanks,
> Ola!

Perfect, that did the trick - had not realized there was a specific pae-devel
package.

*** Bug 432308 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

*** Bug 432288 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

On kernel-2.6.18-53.1.6.el5xen (x86_64) this exploit makes kernel panic.

Not to detract from the real work, but can someone describe the
access-restricted bugs marked as blocking this? (Bug #432252, Bug #432253). Thanks.

These are simply tracking bugs for specific affected products.

The stap command doesn't work on FC7, latest kernel (i.e. without the fix):
# uname -a
Linux host 2.6.23.14-64.fc7 #1 SMP Sun Jan 20 22:20:19 EST 2008 x86_64 x86_64
x86_64 GNU/Linux
# stap -v -g -e 'probe syscall.vmsplice {
   printf("blocking vmsplice (%s) uid %d pid %d exec %s\n", argstr, uid(),
pid(), execname())
   $nr_segs = 0
}'
Pass 1: parsed user script and 54 library script(s) in 210usr/0sys/226real ms.
semantic error: probe point mismatch at position 1 (alternatives: accept access
acct add_key adjtimex alarm arch_prctl bdflush bind brk capget capset chdir
chmod chown chown16 chroot clock_getres clock_gettime clock_nanosleep
clock_settime close compat_getitimer compat_nanosleep compat_setitimer
compat_utime connect creat delete_module dup dup2 epoll_create epoll_ctl
epoll_wait execve exit exit_group fadvise64 fadvise64_64 fchdir fchmod fchown
fchown16 fcntl fdatasync fgetxattr flistxattr flock fork fremovexattr fsetxattr
fstat fstatfs fstatfs64 fsync ftruncate ftruncate64 futex get_mempolicy getcwd
getdents getdents64 getegid getegid16 geteuid geteuid16 getgid getgid16
getgroups getgroups16 gethostname getitimer getpeername getpgid getpgrp getpid
getppid getpriority getresgid getresgid16 getresuid getresuid16 getrlimit
getrusage getsid getsockname getsockopt gettid gettimeofday getuid getuid16
getxattr init_module io_cancel io_destroy io_getevents io_setup io_submit ioctl
ioperm iopl ioprio_get ioprio_set kexec_load keyctl kill lchown lchown16
lgetxattr link listen listxattr llistxattr llseek lookup_dcookie lremovexattr
lseek lsetxattr lstat madvise mbind mincore mkdir mkdirat mknod mlock mlockall
mmap mmap2 modify_ldt mount mprotect mq_getsetattr mq_notify mq_open
mq_timedreceive mq_timedsend mq_unlink mremap msgctl msgget msgrcv msgsnd msync
munlock munlockall munmap nanosleep nfsservctl ni_syscall nice old_getrlimit
open pause personality pipe pivot_root poll prctl pread64 ptrace pwrite64
quotactl read readahead readlink readv reboot recv recvfrom recvmsg
remap_file_pages removexattr rename request_key restart_syscall rmdir
rt_sigaction rt_sigaction32 rt_sigpending rt_sigprocmask rt_sigqueueinfo
rt_sigreturn rt_sigsuspend rt_sigtimedwait sched_get_priority_max
sched_get_priority_min sched_getaffinity sched_getparam sched_getscheduler
sched_rr_get_interval sched_setaffinity sched_yield select semctl semget semop
semtimedop send sendfile sendmsg sendto set_mempolicy set_tid_address
setdomainname setfsgid setfsgid16 setfsuid setfsuid16 setgid setgid16 setgroups
setgroups16 sethostname setitimer setpgid setpriority setregid setregid16
setresgid setresgid16 setresuid setresuid16 setreuid setreuid16 setrlimit setsid
setsockopt settimeofday settimeofday32 setuid setuid16 setxattr sgetmask shmctl
shmdt shmget shutdown sigaltstack signal sigpending sigprocmask socket
socketpair ssetmask stat statfs statfs64 stime swapoff swapon symlink sync
sysctl sysfs sysinfo syslog tgkill time timer_create timer_delete
timer_getoverrun timer_gettime timer_settime times tkill truncate tux umask
umount uname unlink uselib ustat ustat32 utime utimes vhangup wait4 waitid write
writev) while resolving probe point syscall.vmsplice
Pass 2: analyzed script: 0 p...

Note that to use systemtap you would need to have installed the kernel debuginfo
packages for your kernel. See
http://www.redhat.com/magazine/011sep05/features/systemtap/ for details on how
to set up systemtap.

In reply to comment #20; there are some bugs in the exploit which means that it
doesn't work directly on x86_64 machines, although it can be modified to do so.

(In reply to comment #13)
> The stap command doesn't work on FC7, latest kernel (i.e. without the fix):
> # uname -a
> Linux host 2.6.23.14-64.fc7 #1 SMP Sun Jan 20 22:20:19 EST 2008 x86_64 x86_64
> x86_64 GNU/Linux
> Pass 1: parsed user script and 54 library script(s) in 210usr/0sys/226real ms.
> semantic error: probe point mismatch at position 1 [...]

Some older systemtap versions lack the "syscall.vmsplice" alias.
I'm sorry I didn't check, but the one in fedora7 (0.5.13-1.fc7)
misses it too. If you add the following clause to your script,
(and if other prerequisites are present), it should work:

probe syscall.vmsplice = kernel.function("sys_vmsplice") ? {
        name = "vmsplice"
        argstr = sprintf("%d, %p, %d, 0x%x", $fd, $iov, $nr_segs, $flags)
}

I can confirm the sample exploit will segfault on athlon on a bare system (would
likely be patchable), but will work as supplied on a XenU.

Segfault: Linux xxxx 2.6.23.9-85.fc8 #1 SMP Fri Dec 7 15:49:59 EST 2007 i686
athlon i386 GNU/Linux

Exploitable: Linux xxxx 2.6.21-2952.fc8xen #1 SMP Mon Nov 19 07:06:55 EST 2007
i686 athlon i386 GNU/Linux

The exploit worked for me w/o a segfault on i386 Duron (
kernel-2.6.18-53.1.6.el5 ) and x86_64 Athlon X2 (5200+ - same kernel but x86_64
install)

on i386 it did not consistently work, and I'm guessing related, the machine had
to be rebooted as it kept dropping ssh connections after the exploit was run.

Both boxes are CentOS (opposed to RHEL) if it matters.

Can you please supply a complete systemtap script for versions older than FC7?

I verified it working on RHEL5 and RHEL 5.1 32bit boxes using both the older and
newer -53 kernels in both single and SMP installs.

The exploit does seem to make the systems unstable and they have crashed after
running a little longer after someone uses this exploit.

I've compiled an interim RPM for my internal use, as I considered this safer
than the kernel module which has caused panics. It's the same as 2.6.18-53
Centos, but with the upstream kernel patch applied. Obviously your mileage may vary.

http://erek.blumenthals.com/blog/2008/02/11/rhel-5-centos-5-kernel-rpms-patched-against-vmsplice-local-root-exploit/

That's against 2.6.53.1.6, not 2.6.53 as I said previously.

To answer my own question, this works:

stap -v -g -e 'probe syscall.vmsplice = kernel.function("sys_vmsplice") ? {
        name = "vmsplice"
        argstr = sprintf("%d, %p, %d, 0x%x", $fd, $iov, $nr_segs, $flags)
}

probe syscall.vmsplice {
   printf("blocking vmsplice (%s) uid %d pid %d exec %s\n", argstr, uid(),
pid(), execname())
   $nr_segs = 0
}'

There is also a kernel module fix that catches vmsplice calls:
http://home.powertech.no/oystein/ptpatch2008/

Makefile and source code worked as is for my 2.6.23.14-115.fc8 x86_64 kernel.
After insmod, execution of the exploit fails:

$ sudo insmod ptpatch2008.ko
$ dmesg | tail -3
ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
ptpatch2008: syscalls ffffffff81270780
hooked sys_vmsplice
$ ./exploit_test
[...]
[-] vmsplice: Invalid argument
$ dmesg | tail -4
ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
ptpatch2008: syscalls ffffffff81270780
hooked sys_vmsplice
ptpatch2008: possible EXPLOIT attempt by uid 500.

I've grabbed the koji build, any word on when the fix will be pushed to
updates[-testing]?

(In reply to comment #18)
> There is also a kernel module fix that catches vmsplice calls:
> http://home.powertech.no/oystein/ptpatch2008/
>
> Makefile and source code worked as is for my 2.6.23.14-115.fc8 x86_64 kernel.
> After insmod, execution of the exploit fails:
>
> $ sudo insmod ptpatch2008.ko
> $ dmesg | tail -3
> ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
> ptpatch2008: syscalls ffffffff81270780
> hooked sys_vmsplice
> $ ./exploit_test
> [...]
> [-] vmsplice: Invalid argument
> $ dmesg | tail -4
> ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
> ptpatch2008: syscalls ffffffff81270780
> hooked sys_vmsplice
> ptpatch2008: possible EXPLOIT attempt by uid 500.

This is perfect for our needs. Can anyone confirm that this patch is safe? I'm
afraid my code reviewing days are behind me. :)

-Matt

Hey boys, Debian has already fixed this, where is Red Hat? Thank you very much.

> Hey boys, Debian has already fixed this, where is Red Hat? Thank you very much.

Doing quality control on the produced updates, presumably.

RHAT had it fixed on 2/8 see the .79 kernel in:

http://people.redhat.com/dzickus/el5/79.el5

I tested it on i686 and was unable to use millw0rm exploit 5092 or 5093. it also
fixes another NFS issue from bug 431092.

(In reply to comment #31)
> RHAT had it fixed on 2/8 see the .79 kernel in:
>
> http://people.redhat.com/dzickus/el5/79.el5
>
> I tested it on i686 and was unable to use millw0rm exploit 5092 or 5093. it also
> fixes another NFS issue from bug 431092.

However, keep in mind that it is a TEST kernel. The .78 kernel I tested and
confirmed about the nfs fix is UNstable and some people are experiencing system
instability / crashes.

The Red Hat Security Response Team is working with engineering and QA on the
updated packages for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5. We'll release them immediately
to the Red Hat Network once they pass our testing and QA processes.

(Updated Fedora kernels are currently being pushed live and will be available soon)

FYI ptpatch2008 under fc6 yields this:

ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
ptpatch2008: no sct, bailing out

The kernel module stops the exploit on my latest FC7 2.6.23.14-64.fc8 x86_64
kernel.
The kernel-debuginfo etc. packages are hundreds and hundreds of meg, so a few
K of kernel module is a much better interim fix, imvho.

On an unpatched 2.6.23, I got this:

Feb 11 20:56:52 holly kernel: ptpatch2008: init, (c) 2008 <email address hidden>
Feb 11 20:56:52 holly kernel: ptpatch2008: syscalls c0622540
Feb 11 20:56:52 holly kernel: ptpatch2008: syscall table might be readonly
Feb 11 20:56:52 holly kernel: hooked sys_vmsplice

I ran a quick test of the exploit code, which failed with a "[-] wtf" error,
then a few seconds later the message log filled up with this:

Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0
action 0x0
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: cmd b0/da:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00
tag 0 cdb 0x0 data 0
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: res 51/04:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00
Emask 0x1 (device error)
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: Host Protected Area detected:
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: current size: 321670847 sectors
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: native size: 321672960 sectors
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: Host Protected Area detected:
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: current size: 321670847 sectors
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: native size: 321672960 sectors
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1: EH complete
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0
action 0x0
Feb 11 20:57:54 holly kernel: ata1.00: cmd b0/da:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00 t
ag 0 cdb 0x0 data 0
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: res 51/04:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00 E
mask 0x1 (device error)
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: Host Protected Area detected:
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: current size: 321670847 sectors
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: native size: 321672960 sectors
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: Host Protected Area detected:
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: current size: 321670847 sectors
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: native size: 321672960 sectors
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: configured for UDMA/133
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1: EH complete
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x0 SErr 0x0 act
ion 0x0
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: cmd b0/da:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00 t
ag 0 cdb 0x0 data 0
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: res 51/04:00:00:4f:c2/00:00:00:00:00/00 E
mask 0x1 (device error)
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly smartd[4692]: smartd version 5.36 [i686-redhat-linux-gnu]
Copyright (C) 2002-6 Bruce Allen
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: ata1.00: Host Protected Area detected:
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly smartd[4692]: Home page is http://smartmontools.sourceforg
e.net/
Feb 11 21:02:08 holly kernel: current size: 321670847 sectors

And the machine promptly panicked.

FYI..this ptpatch2008 kernel module compiles fine, but causes a GPF/crash on a
AMD64 box when insmod is attempted.

The system tap does not seem to catch/deny every run of the exploit in my
testing. They all seem to get logged, but many of them still get a root prompt.

The system is also still unstable, and either the exploit running multiple times
or the system tap eventually cause a kernel crash.

kernel-2.6.23.15-137.fc8 has been pushed to the Fedora 8 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report.

(In reply to comment #16)
> (In reply to comment #13)
> > @Ryan, make sure you have kernel-PAE-devel installed, and then undo your
> > Makefile path changes. The modules compile and insmod properly for me.
Thanks,
> > Ola!
> Perfect, that did the trick - had not realized there was a specific pae-devel
> package.

I was able to successfully compile the module on a FC5 system, but when trying
to add via insmod, I get:

insmod: error inserting 'ptpatch2008.ko': -1 Operation not permitted

(In reply to comment #36)
> The system tap does not seem to catch/deny every run of the exploit in my
> testing. They all seem to get logged, but many of them still get a root prompt.

The systemtap script proposed in comment #35 is a poor choice, so is
now hidden in order to avoid misleading the public. It interfered
with multiple functions in fs/splice.c, and did not actually block
the vmsplice attempt but rather just attempt to log and punish it.

If you have the prerequisites for this tool though, try the simpler
script listed in bug #432229 comment #17.

Will kernel-xen packages also be created?

Just a quick status update; we have updated kernel packages released for Fedora
(see linked bugs) and are finishing up the QA process for Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 5. We expect this to be completed shortly (pending successful completion
of testing). This will be RHSA-2008:0129.

This vulnerability, CVE-2008-0600, did not affect Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1,
3, or 4. Updated packages to correct this vulnerability are now available for
Red Hat Enterprise Linux along with our advisory at the URL:

https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2008-0129.html

Since all Red Hat and Fedora products are not updated, closing the bug.

(In reply to comment #26)
> Will kernel-xen packages also be created?
>

bug #432517 was created to track kernel-xen packages.

*** Bug 432319 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

*** Bug 441414 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

Possibly similar to 23220 however on 64-bit recent Debian sid with
trivial code I see : https://www.webb-dev.co.uk/category/crypto/

mimas$
mimas$ uname -a http://www.compilatori.com/category/services/
Linux mimas 5.10.0-6-sparc64 #1 Debian 5.10.28-1 (2021-04-09) sparc64 GNU/Linux
mimas$
http://www.acpirateradio.co.uk/category/services/
mimas$
mimas$ /usr/bin/gcc --version http://www.logoarts.co.uk/category/services/
gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO http://www.slipstone.co.uk/category/services/
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

mimas$ http://embermanchester.uk/category/services/

mimas$
mimas$ cat -n foo.c http://connstr.net/category/services/
     1
     2 #include <stdio.h>
     3 #include <stdlib.h>
     4 http://joerg.li/category/services/
     5 int main(int argc, char **argv)
     6 {
     7 int a = 1;
     8 http://www.jopspeech.com/category/services/
     9 printf("a = %i\n", a);
    10 http://www.wearelondonmade.com/category/services/
    11 printf("&a = %p\n", &a);
    12
    13 return EXIT_SUCCESS;
    14 https://waytowhatsnext.com/category/crypto/
    15 }
    16
mimas$ http://www.iu-bloomington.com/category/crypto/

mimas$
mimas$ /usr/bin/gcc -std=iso9899:1999 -pedantic -pedantic-errors -fno-builtin https://komiya-dental.com/category/crypto/ -g -m64 -O0 -mno-app-regs -mcpu=ultrasparc -mmemory-model=tso -o foo foo.c
mimas$ http://www-look-4.com/category/services/

mimas$
mimas$ TERM=dumb LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/gdb ./foo
GNU gdb (Debian 10.1-2) 10.1.90.20210103-git