Exploit for unpatched CVE reported in wild.
Affects | Status | Importance | Assigned to | Milestone | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
eglibc (Ubuntu) |
Fix Released
|
Undecided
|
Unassigned | ||
glibc (Ubuntu) |
Fix Released
|
Undecided
|
Unassigned |
Bug Description
CVEs are as follows:
CVE-2012-3404
CVE-2012-3405
CVE-2012-3406
lsb_release -rd
Description: Ubuntu 10.04.3 LTS
Release: 10.04
Package: libc6 (2.11.1-
Details of the bugs are here upstream:
http://
We received reports from a colleague at another University that they have suffered a root compromise as a result of one of these CVEs, which I notice do not appear to be fixed yet in Ubuntu. They are running Scientific Linux 6 rather than Ubuntu, so can't be directly compared
Debian appear to have fixes out for 2 of the 3 CVEs
http://
They considered the security risk low, but I have reports of exploits in the wild.
The details I have so far from my colleague are as follows:
09:49 < DaveAG> Was it RHSA-2012:1098-1 you reckon bit you?
09:49 < colleague> erm, one of CVE-2012-3404, CVE-2012-3405, CVE-2012-3406
09:49 < colleague> I don't have an RHSA number to hand since this is SL
09:50 < DaveAG> Yeah, that RHSA lists those 3 CVEs
09:51 < colleague> Announced on the 18th July, we got done on 26th, that's scarily quick
09:52 < colleague> There must be an exploit specifically related to use of /bin/mount
09:53 < colleague> Lovely that with auditd running we immediately were able to spot which suid had been used to get root
09:53 < colleague> and the lack of command line arguments to the command meant it had to be done using the environment to change the way the output was formatted
09:57 < colleague> oh, and blocking the loading of kernel modules helped a lot
09:57 < colleague> It forced the attacker into trying something much more difficult which crashed the kernel.
Related branches
security vulnerability: | yes → no |
visibility: | private → public |
Changed in eglibc (Ubuntu): | |
status: | New → Confirmed |
Changed in glibc (Ubuntu): | |
status: | New → Confirmed |
Changed in eglibc (Ubuntu): | |
status: | In Progress → Fix Committed |
tags: | added: verification-done |
Apologies for setting this back as a security bug, i didnt see Marc set it as a non-vulnerability (aka "Public" only bug). I've rectified my mistake.