2016-03-10 12:09:57 |
Stuart McLaren |
bug |
|
|
added bug |
2016-03-10 12:36:42 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
bug task added |
|
ossa |
|
2016-03-10 12:36:55 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
description |
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments.
--
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
|
2016-03-10 12:36:58 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
ossa: status |
New |
Incomplete |
|
2016-03-10 12:37:14 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Glance Core security contacts |
2016-03-14 15:45:27 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber OSSG CoreSec |
2016-05-03 21:54:19 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
ossa: status |
Incomplete |
Opinion |
|
2016-05-31 19:53:43 |
Nikhil Komawar |
bug |
|
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added subscriber Nova Core security contacts |
2016-05-31 19:53:52 |
Nikhil Komawar |
glance: status |
New |
Confirmed |
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2016-05-31 19:53:58 |
Nikhil Komawar |
glance: importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
2017-09-25 18:24:51 |
Tristan Cacqueray |
bug task added |
|
ossn |
|
2020-02-27 20:22:34 |
Jeremy Stanley |
description |
This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments.
--
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under
embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed
(private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated
publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the
form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes
discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as
mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also
avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved
for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to
those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All
discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and
any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This
embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made
public by or on that date if no fix is identified.
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
|
2020-05-27 16:58:25 |
Jeremy Stanley |
description |
This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under
embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed
(private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated
publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the
form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes
discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as
mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also
avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved
for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to
those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All
discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and
any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This
embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made
public by or on that date if no fix is identified.
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:
$ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| Property | Value |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
| checksum | None |
| container_format | bare |
| created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| deleted | False |
| deleted_at | None |
| disk_format | raw |
| id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |
| is_public | False |
| min_disk | 0 |
| min_ram | 0 |
| name | img2 |
| owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |
| protected | False |
| size | 37 |
| status | active |
| updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |
| virtual_size | None |
+------------------+--------------------------------------+
Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address.
The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens.
In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. |
|
2020-05-27 16:58:31 |
Jeremy Stanley |
information type |
Private Security |
Public |
|