core/host/mkdir perms applied too liberally

In the case of creating leading paths (os.makedirs) with restrictive permissions and setting a user, I think the behavior of host.mkdirs() is confusing. You will easily run into a situation where you lock the target user out of the created directory.

EX:

  host.mkdirs("/tmp/leading/target", owner="daemon", group="daemon", perms=0700)

this will create

  /tmp/leading as 0700 owner root/root

and

  /tmp/leading/target as 0700 owner daemon/daemon

Which will yield an unreadable dir for daemon/daemon. Instead, I think what would be expected is for just the leaf dir to get the altered permissions, and altered user/group. Typically when calling mkdir -p you are concerned about creating the leaf dir and a "don't care" about the leading paths. It would be nice if thi behavior was reflected (and documented) in the function.